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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an assessment of the existing preferences on the products currently exported in 
a few key developed countries’ markets: EU, Japan and US. The analysis is undertaken drawing on 
the trade preferences database provided by the most recent version (release 6) of the GTAP 
database. This includes a presentation of the structure of tariff regimes in these key developed 
countries and identification of countries and sectors that are most reliant on tariff preferences. The 
paper computes theoretically consistent protection indexes using a comparative static applied 
general equilibrium model (Global Trade Analysis Project – GTAP) featuring imperfect 
competition. We construct bilateral indicators of protection focused on the applied tariffs faced by 
the exports of each country, using an index of trade policy restrictiveness, the Mercantilistic Trade 
Restrictiveness Index (MTRI), as the tariff aggregator. Our results provide a picture which is quite 
different from the one yielded by traditional indexes, such as the trade-weighted tariff average, or 
market access measures based on bound tariffs. 
 
Jel code: F13 (Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations), C68 - Computable 
General Equilibrium Models Q17 (Agriculture in International Trade ) 
                                                 
∗
 This work was in part supported by the AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (TRADEAG) project, funded by 
the European Commission under contract no. FP6-513666; and in part supported by the Italian Ministry of University 
and Technological Research (“The new multilateral trade negotiations within the World Trade Organisation (Doha 
Round): liberalisation prospects and the impact on the Italian economy”). 
♣
 The opinions and judgements expressed in this paper only reflect those of the author, while they do not reflect those 
of FAO or its member governments. 
 2 
1 Introduction 
The study of the impact of industrial nations tariffs on the level and composition of their imports 
from developing countries has a long tradition (Balassa, 1965 and 1967). There are two major 
sources of bias against imports from developing countries: first, tariffs used by industrial nations 
have been found to bear more heavily on products of export interest to developing countries than on 
all imports or imports from other industrial nations; the second bias relates to tariff escalation.  
On the other hand, over the years, major trading countries have extended trade preferences through 
a range of schemes aimed at promoting export growth in beneficiary countries. Preferential 
agreements are discriminatory policies entailing trade liberalization with respect to a subset of 
trading partners, which have been frequently utilized as an instrument for integrating the developing 
countries into the world trading system, on the basis of the assumption that this would promote their 
development. The world trading system is characterized by a wide variety of such agreements, 
which can be broadly categorized into two major types: reciprocal, entailing symmetric trade 
liberalization, and nonreciprocal, entailing asymmetric trade liberalization aimed at providing 
support to the country which gains improved market access without being required to open up its 
own domestic market.  
Several studies have recently assessed the role of preferences (Bouët et al., 2005c; Candau and Jean, 
2005), Hoekman and Ozden, 2005; Low et al., 2006). In particular, a comprehensive survey of 
studies on the benefits of preference regimes, undertaken by the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2003), indicates that despite the different methodologies, 
different data sets and different assumptions, the overall impact of preferential trade arrangements 
on welfare and trade is non-negligible and generally positive, but also relatively small. 
This paper contributes to this literature through a comparative assessment of the actual degree of 
market access granted by the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and Japan to different 
countries or group of countries. Two features of this study represent improvements over other 
attempts in the literature. Firstly, we use the detailed and comprehensive information on the level of 
applied trade barriers provided by the MAcMap database (Bouët et al., 2005a). Secondly, we assess 
the differential incidence of tariffs not relying on purely statistical measure of protection, such as 
average tariff rates, but we use a theoretically sound measure of market access: the Mercantilsitic 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (Anderson and Neary, 2003). Bilateral MTRIs are estimated on the 
basis of bilateral trade flows generated within a general equilibrium model framework. 
The paper is organized into five more sections. The next section summarizes some major initiatives 
recently undertaken by the EU, the US and Japan in the area of preferences. Section 3 is devoted to 
the description of the model and database employed. The following section explains the approach 
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followed to develop the index used to compare the protection faced by different exporter in each 
market. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. A brief review of European Union, Japan and United States major preferential 
schemes 
European Union 
The EU is engaged in a web of preferential trade relations with other countries or regional 
groupings, which can be conceived as being made up of ‘concentric circles’, each one involving a 
different intensity of preferences, reciprocity and co-operation instruments. These range from the 
core integration among the 25 members, to the most distant circle where most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment is applied according to the WTO rules. Between these two extremes there are the 
trade regimes applied to the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein)  and 
Switzerland; the Mediterranean partners (the Euro-Med agreements); the Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific (ACP – formerly the Lome Convention, now the Cotonou Agreement) regime; the 
“Everything But Arms” preferences for least-developed countries (LDCs); the bilateral free trade 
areas with Mexico, South Africa (SA) and Chile, plus the ongoing negotiations with Mercosur; and 
the Generalyzed System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries which are not included in 
the previous categories. 
The unilateral preferences granted by the EU for developing countries exports are regulated by two 
main trade arrangements: 
a) The GSP scheme recently extended till 2008.1 The new EU GSP scheme, which was decided in 
April 2005, includes 3 categories of benefits: the General Scheme for all developing countries (with 
40 percent of products receiving duty-free access, but with ceilings and graduation criteria that 
eliminate largest exporters); the ‘Everything but arms’ initiative granting to the LDCs duty-free 
access on all products with the exception of arms and munitions; the ‘GSP plus’, providing duty-
free access to all products from ‘countries with special development needs’ which implement 
international conventions on the environment, and on human rights, and labour standards. The EBA 
considerably improved the preferential market access granted to LDCs, though a significant 
limitation may be found in the absence of improvement in the field of rules of origin. 
b) The Cotonou Partnership Agreement includes preferences and linkages between trade and 
financial assistance for the over 70 ACP countries, which are mostly former colonies of the EU 
member States. The agreements constitutes the follow-up of a series of Yaoundè and Lomé 
                                                 
1
 The GSP Scheme is an exception to the MFN principle and was introduced into the GATT in 1971: it allows GATT 
(and then WTO) members to grant unilateral preferences to products originating from developing countries. 
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Conventions which provided non-reciprocal trade benefits in 99 percent of the industrial goods and 
some agricultural products. The Lomé preferences will last until 31 December 2007 (except for 
LDCs), after which reciprocity will be gradually introduced through new Economic Partnership 
Agreements. While the GSP is conceived as a unilateral, unbound grant by industrialized countries, 
the Lomé/Cotonou preferences are an integral part of a broader international treaty which is legally 
binding upon the two parties and by which the EU has committed itself on a contractual basis to 
ensure non-reciprocal preferential market access conditions for ACP products. 
Concerning the bilateral Agreements, those with Mexico, Chile, and South Africa (SA) provide for 
progressive mutual liberalisation of goods and services, although free trade in agriculture and 
fisheries is not fully reciprocal and it is limited to lists of products. In the case of SA, for example, 
EU is bound to offer duty-free access to 95 percent (only 62 percent in the case of agricultural 
products) of SA products by 2010.  
Finally, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements apply to 10 Mediterranean partners as agreed at the 
1995 Barcelona Conference, which launched the Euro-Mediterranean partnership with the goal to 
establish a Free Trade Area by 2010. The Bilateral Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements are 
a first step in this direction; some of these provide for non-reciprocal free access for non-sensitive 
products into the EU market and progressive liberalization for other products. 
United States 
In the case of the US, a number of nonreciprocal preferential agreements are granted mainly to 
Latin American and African countries, either for developmental purposes, or with the aim at 
tackling specific economic and/or social problems of the regions. Moreover, a number of free-trade 
agreements are undertaken with Canada and Mexico – under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) – and also with Australia, Chile, Israel, Jordan, and Singapore. 
In general, the US follows the criterion of granting non reciprocal or unilateral preferential tariff 
treatment mostly to countries which qualify for the GSP. The US GSP programme provides for 
duty-free entry to all products covered by the scheme from designated beneficiaries. The scheme 
has been in operation since 1976, and then it has always been renewed.2  
A significant improvement in the US scheme was recorded in 1997, when 1,783 new peoducts 
originating in LDCs were granted duty-free treatment. However, certain articles are excluded from 
the list of eligible products, and any article determined to be “import-sensitive” cannot be made 
eligible. Furthermore, the US scheme provides for ceilings for each product and country 
(“competitive need limits”), as well as for a “graduation” mechanism (Inama, 2006). 
                                                 
2
 The latest renewal occurred in 2002 and officially reauthorized the scheme through December 2006. 
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Other examples of non reciprocal developmental-based initiatives are the Caribbean Basin Trade 
Partnership Act (CBTPA), which was signed in 2000, with the aim of promoting the development 
of trade relations and the diversification of the small economies of the region. A similar initiative is 
The Andean Trade Preference Act, which was started in 1991 and expanded in 2002 under the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, with the aim of combating drug production and 
trafficking in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  
Another important initiative is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was first 
signed in year 2000, and subsequently extended in July 2004 to a time horizon up to year 2015. The 
initiatives involves 37 African countries, to which the initiative offers duty free access for most 
agricultural commodities, some subject to tariff rate quotas and quota free access, as well as a 
certain number of textile and oil products. Rules of origin require that products should be grown, 
produced or manufactured in a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, subject to a number of 
additional conditions related to national security, trade liberalisation, human rights respect, which 
are reviewed on an annual basis.  
Altogether, LDCs are eligible for duty-free access with respect to the vast majority – 83 percent 
according to the US authorities - of the products listed in the US tariff schedule. 
Concerning the free trade agreements, the implementation of the NAFTA started in 1994, and it has 
brought about a progressive elimination of trade barriers among the three countries involved. The 
agreement with Australia has been implemented since January 2005, and involves a progressive 
elimination of tariffs between the two countries over a period of 18 years as a maximum. Most 
tariffs on manufacture goods have been eliminated from the beginning, while exceptions include 
sugar and some dairy products on the US side, while Australia has agreed to maintain its quarantine 
system. With Chile, the agreement come into force in 2004, and it involves the establishment of a 
free trade area over a 12-years period. The vast majority of industrial goods have been covered by 
the agreement since its inception – up to 85 percent - while duties on other products are due to be 
gradually phased out. Finally, a free trade agreement was negotiated in 2004 with Morocco, 
providing for the implementation since the first of January 2006, as a first step of a wider strategy 
involving other countries in the Middle Eastern region. Most tariffs have to be eliminated 
immediately, while 5 percent of the lines will be gradually phased out over a period of nine years.  
Japan 
Also for Japan, the preferential trade policy mainly include the GSP system on the one hand, and a 
number of reciprocal regional agreements on the other. The Japanese scheme of generalized 
preferences was recently reviewed and extended for a new decade, until 31 March 2014. It provides 
selected preferences to 140 developing countries with reduction of MFN duties for agricultural 
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products according to a positive list approach. Most industrial products are covered and granted 
duty-free subject to ceiling and maximum country amounts. On average, the degree of preference is 
higher for industrial products than for agricultural ones, and a number of specific goods are 
excluded from the agreements, such as dairy products, footwear and textiles and clothing. 
Preferential margins are relatively low also for certain manufactured goods, such as leather, rubber, 
footwear and travel services. 
LDCs enjoys a special treatment (duty-free entry, exemption from ceiling restrictions) for an 
extended list of products, which is deemed to account for about 80 to 90 percent of the total import 
value from these countries. Similar benefits has been granted since 2003 also to Singapore, under 
the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership (JSEPA), which covers a 
number of agricultural and fishery products.  
Concerning reciprocal agreements, the main initiative in which Japan is involved is the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), which was started in 1989, and sees the participation of 21 
members economies, including Asian countries but also the US and the Russian Federation. The 
APEC goals include the establishment of a free trade area and an open investment space in the 
Asia-Pacific region by year 2010 for the more industrialised economies, and by year 2020 for the 
developing economies which are participating in the initiative. Since 2003, Japan has also started a 
structured dialogue with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), within the 
“Framework for a Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership”, which involves regular 
consultations on the liberalization and facilitation of trade in goods, with the aim of negotiating a 
free-trade area by year 2012.  
 
 
3. Model and database 
We use the GTAP model of global trade (version 6.2), that is a static, multi-region, general 
equilibrium model based on a representative household taking decisions about consumption, 
production, and public expenditure. The model includes international trade and transport margins, 
and bilateral international trade flows are handled assuming that products are exogenously 
differentiated by origin (Armington, 1969). As a standard closure, global investment adjusts to 
global saving, so that national balances of payments are endogenous: a “global bank” allocates 
world savings and investment across the countries or regions. As from Hertel (1997) and the GTAP 
web site (www.gtap.org), the model includes: demand for goods for final consumption (based on a 
Constant Difference of Elasticity functional form), intermediate use and government consumption, 
 7 
demands for factor inputs (based on a Constant Elasticity of Substitution functional form), supplies 
of factors and goods, and international trade in goods and services.  
The GTAP database is based on a set of the Social Accounting Matrices for individual countries; 
the latest version of GTAP database, version 6.2, provides a baseline referred to year 2001 for up to 
a maximum of 87 regions and 57 sectors. Trade policy is set at the tariff line level, but this implies a 
level of detail that is not consistent with the GTAP (or any other existing) model: the EU tariff 
schedule, for example, includes more than 10000 tariff lines. To reach consistency between trade 
distortions and model aggregation, a-theoretic trade weighted average tariffs are used.  
It should be noted that the quality of the trade distortion data included in the version 6 of the GTAP 
database is much better than in the previous release due to the use of the MacMap-HS6 (version 1), 
a database at the HS-6 level intended to provide a set of consistent and exhaustive ad valorem 
equivalents (AVEs) of applied border protection across the world.3 This resulted in considering 
applied/preferential tariffs rather than bound ones, and in a more accurate computation of the AVE 
for each trade instrument (Bouët et al., 2005a). 
Specific tariffs are converted in AVEs terms by taking the ration of each import duty and a unit 
value, whose choice is a rather sensitive issue both from a theoretical and a political point of view. 
In MacMap, AVEs calculations are based on the median unit value of worldwide exports 
originating from a reference group to which the exporter belongs.4 
For mixed tariffs, i.e. tariffs involving a choice (a maximum or a minimum operator) between 
different terms, the MacMap approach is the following:  
• when the tariff is defined as an ad valorem base tariff, with in addition a cap and a floor 
(which are defined in specific terms), the base tariff is retained. If the base tariff is in 
specific terms and the cap and the floor are ad valorem, a simple average of the two bounds 
is retained. This prevents from adding any additional noise through AVE calculation; 
• when the tariff involves a choice between two terms, priority is given to the one defined in 
ad valorem terms. 
Concerning tariff rate quotas, three market regimes are considered, depending on the extent to 
which the quota is filled: 
• if less than 90% of the quota is filled, it is considered not to be binding, hence the in-quota 
tariff rate is chosen as applied rate; 
                                                 
3
 MAcMap-HS6 is regularly improved and updated, and the corresponding information is available on the CEPII's 
website (www.cepii.fr). 
4
 These groups are defined on the basis of a hierarchical clustering analysis based on GDP per capita (in terms of PPP) 
and trade openness. 
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• in the 90% to 99% range the quota is assumed to be binding, hence a simple arithmetic mean 
is considered as applied rate; 
• if more than 99% of the quota is filled, this is considered to be binding, and therefore out-
quota tariff rate is chosen as applied rate. 
Finally, for prohibitive tariffs – whose presence is problematic when calculating AVEs - an upper 
limit to the is established starting at the HS6 level, which involves setting 1,000% as a maximum 
for the sum of all measures. 
 
Changes to the model and generation of the 2004 baseline 
In order to evaluate the market access level for all products and services, including agri-food and 
manufactured goods, we adopted an imperfect competition closure for the model. More specifically, 
we adopted the same approach suggested by Francois (1998) in order to model economies of scale 
and monopolistic competition. Regarding the former, scale economies are introduced in an 
otherwise standard specification through a new exogenous variable (OSCALE), while the output 
augmenting technical change variable (AO) is declared endogenous for the relevant sectors. 
As far as the latter is concerned, in each region, when an industry j is assumed to be 
monopolistically competitive, this means that individual firms produce unique varieties of good j, 
and hence are monopolists within their chosen market niche. Given the demand for variety, the 
demand for each variety is less than perfectly elastic. However, while firms are thus able to price as 
monopolists, free entry drives their economic profits to zero, so that pricing is at average cost. 
Moreover, since consumers decide over different varieties and a non-nested structure for import 
demand is adopted, the Armington assumption is dropped. In practice, the substitution parameter 
between the domestic and the composite imported commodities (ESUBD) has been set equal to the 
“Armington elasticity” among imported commodities from different sources (ESUBM), where the 
latter is calibrated from the distance between average and marginal cost (“cost disadvantage ratio”).  
Concerning the service sectors, since the database does not include any protection measures, we 
introduced estimates of ad-valorem equivalent tariffs drawn from the literature (Park, 2002). 
Version 6.2 of the database was aggregated for this application to include 22 regions, 39 products 
and 5 endowments (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Countries, regions, products and endowments
countrie/regions products endowments
Australia&New Zealand Agriculture Land
China Paddy rice Skilled labour
Japan Wheat Unskilled labour
ASEAN Cereal grains Capital
Rest of Asia Vegetables, fruit, nuts Natural resources
ACP countries Oil seeds
LDC countries Sugar cane, sugar beet
EU-25 Plant-based fibers
EU candidades Crops nec
Rest of european countries Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses
Euromed countries Animal products nec
Turkey Vegetable oils and fats
India Raw milk
United States Wool, silk-worm cocoons
Canada Forestry
Mexico Fishing
Argentina Bovine meat products
Brazil Meat products nec
Chile Dairy products
Rest of Latin America Processed rice
No WTO Sugar
Food products nec
Beverages and tobacco products
Manufactures
Minerals
Textile sector
Wood products
Paper products, publishing
Petroleum, coal products
Chemical, rubber, plastic products
Other manufacturing
Metal products
Motor vehicles and parts
Electronic equipment
Services
Water
Construction
Trade
Communication
Transport services
Financial
Other services
 
 
Since the paper focuses on the EU, Japan and the US protection structure, the regional aggregation 
aims to highlight the most relevant regions for the bilateral trade policies of these countries. The 
product aggregation is as detailed as possible, taking into account the estimates available for the 
scale economies and the tariff equivalents. As a consequence, the largest number of products refer 
to the primary sector, but this is an interesting feature of the model, since these products present the 
highest levels of tariff protection (Bureau and Salvatici, 2004). 
 10 
A number of changes have been introduced into the model in order to update the baseline from 
2001 to 2004. Furthermore, we decided to include some policy changes already decided, but that are 
going to be implemented after 2004, such as the sugar sector reform or the EBA initiative in the 
case of the EU. More specifically, GDP, population, labour force and total factor productivity were 
shocked taking into account the changes between 2001 and 2004. Concerning the policy shocks, 
particular consideration was given to the Common Agricultural Policy, which has undergone 
significant modifications over this period: the residual implementation of the “Agenda 2000” 
reform, and the Fischler reform of 2003 (Bach et al., 2000; Brockmeier et al., 2001; van Meijl and 
van Tongeren, 2002). Moreover, the enlargement of the EU, and the related extension of the CAP to 
ten new members was taken into account by removing import tariffs between the EU and the 
CEECs, and through the alignment of export, output and input subsidies or taxes. Finally, a set of 
shocks was introduced into the model to take into account the change in the preferential policy 
pursued with the EBA framework, allowing all imports from the LDC countries to access the EU 
market duty free from 2009. 
Concerning reduction of intervention prices in the sectors of rice, sugar, cereals and dairy products5 
their changes were approximated through changes in the corresponding import taxes. With regards 
to the Fischler reform, given the model’s characteristics, it was only possible to consider the 
decoupling of direct payments, i.e. their switch to non-crop-specific payments. This measure, which 
is considered the most important among those introduced by the 2003 reform, is represented in the 
model through a homogeneous subsidy to land use, captured by an additional variable, whose level 
is determined endogenously on the basis of the expenditure arising in the baseline from the granting 
of crop-specific subsidies. It is worth mentioning that in order to have a proper modelling of the 
CAP, the previous shocks have been implemented distinguishing among the old (EU15) and the 
new (EU10) members of the EU: only at the end of the baseline creation procedure, a new 
aggregation (EU25) was created in order to compute the protection indexes for the enlarged EU. 
Concerning other countries’ policies, some of the provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act were included in 
the baseline, following mostly Bouët et al. (2005b). A reduction in land productivity was introduced 
to take into account the increase in the acreage conservation program; output subsidies were 
increased for cereals and dairy products, but decreased in the case of soybeans.  
Also the decoupled payments of the PROCAMPO program in Mexico have been increased in 2004, 
taking into account the rates applied for farmers with more and less than five hectares of land (FAO, 
                                                 
5
 For raw milk, output quota were modelled by setting production exogenously at the level of the base period, and 
checking after each step undertaken in building the 2004 baseline, that this limit was effectively binding. This prevents 
the quota from acting as a minimum rather than a maximum constraint on output 
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2005) through a weighted average increase based on sizes reported by Eastwood et al. (2004). 
Finally, the recent introduction of direct payments in 13 provinces of China was also taken into 
account (FAO, 2005) as an ad valorem subsidy to land use in cereals, rice, and oilseeds, taking into 
account of the share of the relevant provinces in total arable land. 
Finally, the integration of China into the WTO has been implemented by updating the level of 
tariffs to 2004, based on data from the TRAINS database. In order to be coherent with the GTAP 
database, the tariffs introduced into the model are weighted by trade flows.  
 
 
4. Mercantilistic trade restrictiveness index 
In order to take into the trade impact of protection, one could simply calculate a bilateral trade-
weighted average. As it is known, however, this would underestimate the protection effect, because 
of the endogeneity bias: actual trade is much lower with high tariffs than it would be with lower 
tariffs. On the other hand, using an “equivalence-based” index with a behavioral underpinning such 
as the MTRI, the weights depend on import volumes evaluated at world prices (Anderson and 
Neary, 2005). 
The MTRI relies on the idea that trade policy can be evaluated using trade volume as the reference 
standard, by considering the extent to which trade distortions limit imports from the rest of the 
world. The policy aggregation procedure answers the following question: what is the equivalent 
uniform tariff that, if imposed to a country’s imports, would leave its aggregate imports unchanged? 
Therefore a uniform tariff τµ is defined, that yields the same volume (at world prices) of tariff-
restricted imports as the initial vector of (non-uniform) tariffs. This can be expressed through the 
import demand functions M, holding the balance of trade function at level B0 constant, according to:  
(1) ( )[ ] ( )0*000* ,,,1: BppMBpM =+ µµ ττ , with ( )µµ τ+≡ 1*pp . 
where *p  denotes a vector of international prices ( *kp ) of N goods k = (1,…,N), M0 is the value of 
aggregate imports (at world prices) in the reference period, and p0 is the initially distorted price 
vector. Define the scalar import demand as  
(2) ( ) ( )∑∑
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≡
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,
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where mkcI ,  denotes the uncompensated (Marshallian) import demand function of good k from 
country c. Accordingly, the MTRI uniform tariff τµ would lead to the same volume of imports (at 
world prices) as the one resulting from the uneven tariff structure, denoted by the N-r bilateral 
tariffs matrix T whose elements are tc,k: 
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The previous definition focuses on the overall distortion imposed by a country’s trade policies on its 
import bundle. However, we focus on the calculation of a bilateral version of the MTRI uniform 
tariff, in order to obtain the level of trade restrictiveness imposed on exports of each country c. 
Following Kee et al. (2005) and Antimiani and Salvatici (2005) we compute the MTRI uniform 
tariff bilaterally, to capture the trade restrictiveness that countries impose on each other. 
Accordingly, in equation (2) we only sum over k, rather than over k and c, in order to obtain a 
bilateral uniform tariff MTRI ( µτ c ), defined as follows: 
(4) ( )[ ] 00* ,1: cccc MBpM =+ µµ ττ ,    
where ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
+≡
N
k
kckc
m
kckcc BtpIpBppM
1
0
,
*
,,
*
,
000
,1*,,  is the value of aggregate imports (at world 
prices) from country c in the reference period. 
In this bilateral protection index, trade restrictiveness is the product of the structure of protection 
and the trade flows product specialization. Even if the importing country would apply MFN bound 
tariffs to all exporters, the impact would be differentiated: trade would be more restricted for 
countries whose exports face the highest tariffs. In order to show the structure of protection we 
compute a separate MTRI uniform tariff for each of the three main sectors in the economy: 
agriculture, industry and services. In order to compute the ith sectoral MTRI uniform tariffs ( icµτ ), 
equation 4 is modified as follows: 
(5) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]∑∑
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+≡+
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,1,1: µµ ττ , 
where Ni is the number of products included in each sector (Table 1).  
Finally, in the standard definition prices are assumed to be fixed in world markets. Anderson and 
Neary (2003), argue (footnote 8) that “there is a rationale for a ceteris paribus trade restrictiveness 
index that fixes world prices even when these prices are in fact endogenous”. Such a rationale may 
be represented by the fact that, by keeping world prices constant, one focuses on the component of 
protection explained by national policies, rather that by the degree of market power of the country.  
In our case, though, we need to recast the definition of the MTRI to make it consistent with the 
model used for its computation, since, the GTAP model is global and calculates world prices 
endogenously. Therefore, in order to compute the MTRI taking into account the terms of trade 
impact, we need to redefine the uniform tariff equivalent relaxing the small country assumption. 
The vector of world prices p*, then, is a function of the tariffs T. To accommodate this, the 
definition of the MTRI [see equation (4)] is modified as follows 
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(6) ( ) ( )[ ] 00* ,1: cwccwc MBTpM =+ττ , 
where ( wcτ ) is the bilateral MTRI uniform tariff with endogenous world prices. 
In the case of τµ, totally differentiating (1) to derive the effects of tariff changes, holding p* and B0 
fixed, gives: 
(7) µµµ
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With endogenous world prices ( ** tdpdtpdp += ), totally differentiating equation (1) we get 
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φ is a correction factor which is needed because the import volume function is evaluated at two 
different points (denoted by superscripts): the initial tariff-distorted price vector p0  and the uniform-
tariff-equivalent price vector ( )ww pp τ+≡ 1* . Comparing (7) and (8) it appears that τw could be 
either larger or smaller than τµ. 
The computation of MTRI is performed through the definition of either a new variable, tr(r,s) 
which represents the product-generic tariff levied on imports from region r into region s (EU25, US 
and Japan), or three variables corresponding to the sectoral indexes. Then we run the model, starting 
from our counterfactual baseline, assuming that all trade policies (i.e., tariffs and export subsidies) 
with respect to a specific region s are removed. In the closure, tr(r,s) is set endogenous, while 
aggregate imports at world prices from region s into the EU are exogenized. Alternatively, we fix 
the three aggregate sectoral imports, endogenizing the respective uniform tariffs. In conclusion, we 
ask the model to compute the uniform tariff(s) that would eliminate all incentives to increase or 
decrease the volume of imports from the region/country under consideration.  
 
 
5 Results 
Table 2 presents all the results we obtained for the MTRI bilateral uniform tariffs. 
 
 14 
Table 2 - Uniform tariff (MTRI)* of USA, Japan and EU25 with respect to some countries/areas
tr1 tr2 tr3 tr tr1 tr2 tr3 tr tr1 tr2 tr3 tr
Rest of Europe 9.8 0.8 22.9 4.0 13.3 0.8 28.3 8.2 9.3 0.0 21.6 1.8
EU candidates 11.8 3.6 20.1 11.3 9.1 2.4 23.1 16.7 10.4 -0.7 19.2 1.8
LDC 1.8 3.4 24.1 3.9 62.9 0.2 25.5 15.9 0.0 0.0 20.1 0.8
ACP 9.4 4.6 21.1 6.1 105.5 0.3 23.8 25.3 45.2 0.2 18.7 11.4
Australia&New Zealand 5.5 1.2 22.4 6.1 121.7 0.2 24.1 26.3 15.7 0.6 19.6 9.5
Euromed countries 2.4 2.4 21.3 9.0 7.9 3.9 22.6 15.0 39.1 0.0 18.1 5.9
China 2.6 3.7 38.5 5.5 92.5 3.2 32.4 10.7 25.9 3.5 25.5 7.5
ASEAN 2.8 2.6 25.3 3.4 63.1 0.7 30.4 6.5 15.1 2.9 27.8 7.3
Rest of Asia 0.7 12.3 26.4 12.5 6.8 4.7 27.7 9.3 5.7 7.8 22.0 9.0
Rest of Latin America 3.0 4.4 17.8 4.4 129.4 0.4 22.4 65.9 35.8 0.0 16.7 15.9
Japan 3.5 1.6 24.8 2.0 - - - - 10.2 3.3 26.1 6.1
India 1.2 3.9 25.5 4.9 151.8 1.4 35.2 72.7 48.8 4.1 26.7 17.6
Canada 1.2 0.0 19.2 0.0 81.9 0.5 27.7 36.2 7.5 1.0 21.7 8.8
USA - - - - 67.7 0.2 25.4 16.5 12.1 1.6 21.4 7.9
Mexico 0.3 0.0 22.7 0.0 54.0 1.7 23.2 34.6 8.4 0.1 19.6 5.1
Argentina 9.3 1.5 15.5 4.6 57.1 0.3 21.3 34.7 13.1 1.4 16.9 10.8
Brazil 9.1 2.2 23.5 3.7 13.1 0.4 32.9 6.8 52.2 0.8 25.6 28.9
EU25 4.0 1.3 23.7 5.1 69.0 1.8 27.8 18.3 - - - -
NoWTO 2.4 1.1 23.9 2.0 19.6 0.2 27.1 2.1 5.7 0.7 21.6 2.1
Turkey 7.8 6.3 25.7 9.8 4.5 2.0 22.3 15.9 23.1 0.2 19.8 8.1
Chile 1.8 1.2 21.5 2.2 35.5 0.1 23.4 15.6 9.4 0.1 18.7 3.3
Coefficient of variation 0.80 0.95 0.20 0.77 1.08 0.15 0.81 1.50 0.16
Source: GTAP simulation
*tr: overall MTRI; tr1: MTRI agricoltural sector; tr2: MTRI industrial sector; tr3: MTRI services sector
usa Japan Eu25
 
 
Total MTRI tariff values, reported in the columns under the heading “tr”, show that the overall 
border protection is generally higher in Japan, and lower in the case of the US. Table 3 summarizes 
the degree of reciprocity in market access between US, EU and Japan. There are large imbalances in 
the case of Japan, since both the EU and the US face a much higher protection (3 and 8 times, 
respectively) than the one they impose on Japanese exports. On the contrary, bilateral protection 
rates among EU and US are of the same order of magnitude. 
 
Table 3 - Reciprocal market access between USA, EU and Japan
Exporter/importer EU25 Japan USA
EU25 - 18.3 5.1
Japan 6.1 - 2.0
USA 7.9 16.5 -
Source: GTAP simulation
 
 
Comparing the bilateral protection indexes faced by the exporting countries or regions in the EU, 
Japan and the US markets, we notice that only for one group (“Rest of Asia”) the American market 
is the most protected; in two cases (“ASEAN” and Brazil) this happens with reference to the 
European market; all remaining exporters face the highest protection in the Japanese market. 
There are large differences in the geographical structure of protection of the three countries. Table 4 
presents the correlation and rank correlation (Spearman’s rho) between the results in Table 2. None 
of the pair wise correlation indexes regarding the US is statistically significant: this country, then, 
follows a geographical pattern quite different from the other two. On the other hand, EU and Japan 
have five countries or regions in common between the seven most protected sources of imports – 
India, “Rest of America”, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, “ACP countries” – while the 
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exporters facing the highest barriers in the US market are “Rest of Asia”, Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania (“EU candidates”), Turkey and the “Euromed countries”.  
 
r rho
EU-Japan 0.409* 0.451*
EU-US -0.034 0.183
Japan-US -0.189 0.018
Source: GTAP simulation * significant at 10%
Table 4 - Correlation coefficient and rank correlation coefficient among 
MTRIs uniform tariffs
 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that developing countries benefit from preferential access as a result of 
several trade initiatives (see Section 2), our results show that they still face significant barriers. The 
overall bilateral MTRI uniform tariffs are negatively correlated both with exporters’ GDP and per 
capita GDP (Table 5): the higher is a country’s GDP, the lower the trade barriers imposed by the 
EU, the US or Japan on its exports. In most cases the absolute value of the correlation is quite low, 
but one would have definitely expected a direct relationship as far as developed countries policies 
are concerned. This finding is consistent with other recent results (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga, 2005), 
but it is certainly at odds with the preferential access rhetoric. 
 
Total GDP Per capita GDP
EU -0.052 -0.100
US -0.178 -0.395
Japan -0.118 -0.018
Source: GTAP simulation
Table 5 - Correlation coefficient between MTRI uniform tariffs and GDP 
values
 
 
An explanation for this is that the incidence of nontariff measures in a number of OECD countries 
tends to be disproportionately high on products that developing export – especially agricultural 
products (World Bank, 2005). An implication is that nontariff measures matter, as they tend to 
reduce the effective value of the preferential access granted through tariff exemptions. Thus the 
higher MTRIs against low-income countries may reflect the product composition of imports – 
developing countries happen to export the goods most affected by nontariff measures.  
However, we do not want to emphasize too much this explanation here, since the MacMAP 
database only includes a few of all the existing nontariff barriers (section 3). Accordingly, 
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additional explanations should be provided for the fact that trade policies of high-income countries 
imply higher MTRI uniform tariffs on imports from low income countries.  
In order to shed some light on these apparently puzzling results, we computed the MTRI uniform 
tariffs at the sectoral level: results are reported under the headings “tr1”, “tr2”, “tr3” in Table 2. As 
it could have been expected, protection levels for services (tr3), which were introduced into the 
model through the estimate of the ad valorem equivalents, are quite homogeneous across exporters. 
In the case of goods, agriculture (tr1) and manufactures (tr2), protection levels are much more 
uneven, as it is shown by the values of the coefficient of variation (Table 2). However, it appears 
that protection levels are much higher in agriculture, where the multilateral liberalization process 
only started in 1994 at the end of the Uruguay Round, in comparison with the other goods that have 
come a long way since the creation of the GATT in 1947.  
The fact that the existence of preferential policies does not show up in the overall bilateral indexes 
of protection, then, is mostly due to the distribution of tariffs across activities. Most intra-OECD 
trade is in manufactures, while developed countries’ tariff profiles are heavily biased against 
agricultural imports. As a consequence, developing countries still face an overall level of protection 
higher than developed countries, especially in the case of middle income countries, which do not 
benefit from preferences granted to the poorest countries.  
It is also interesting to check the extent to which trade policies of the US, the EU and Japan show 
some consistency in the structure of preferences across sectors. Table 6 presents the correlation and 
rank correlations between the results for the EU.  
 
r rho
tr1-tr2 -0.037 0.083
tr1-tr3 0.142 0.066
tr2-tr3 0.0561* 0.669**
Source: GTAP simulation
* significant at 0.05
** significant at 0.01
Table 6 - Correlation coefficient and rank correlation coefficient among EU 
bilateral MTRI uniform tariffs in different sectors
 
 
The geographical distributions of agricultural barriers does not seem to have any connections, 
neither in terms of intensity nor in terms of ranking, with the access granted in the case of 
manufactures and services. On the contrary, the protection granted to these two sectors seems to 
follow a common geographical pattern: the bilateral values are directly related and the countries 
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getting a preferential access for their industrial products in several cases are the same that benefit 
from a better access in terms of services. 
We do not present the results in terms of correlation and rank correlation for the US and Japan, 
since they are not significantly different from zero. This implies that there is no significant 
correlations among the levels of protection faced by each exporter. Since the US and Japan trade 
policies determine a different geographical pattern of protection in each sector, the countries facing 
the lowest barriers in one sector are not necessarily the same as those benefiting from a preferential 
treatment in another. 
Looking at the agricultural MTRI tariff values, it appears that the most restricted countries in their 
agricultural trade with the EU are some developing countries – such as Brazil and India – and even 
the ACP countries, a group with a long tradition of (supposedly) preferential access into the EU 
market. The LDCs benefit from the implementation of the EBA initiative, while it is remarkable 
that the countries still waiting to be accepted as WTO members, such as Russia, seem to enjoy quite 
a favourable treatment.  
In the case of the US, the highest barriers in agriculture are faced by non-EU European countries, as 
well as by Latin-American countries – such as Brazil and Argentina, while Canada and Mexico 
benefit from the implementation of the NAFTA. Finally, Japanese agricultural protection is 
relatively high vis-à-vis India, Oceania and China; while Middle-east and North African countries 
enjoy more favourable access conditions.  
It is worth emphasizing three somehow unexpected results. Firstly, the LDCs enjoy a strong 
preferential access only in the EU market; it should be recalled, however, that in this case the 
elimination of all restrictions on LDCs’ exports following the implementation of the EBA initiative 
was explicitly introduced in the baseline.  
Secondly, the countries which are not WTO members do not seem to be worse off in terms of the 
trade barriers they face, a finding that may cast doubts on the (real) reasons for joining the “WTO 
club”. There is some evidence, indeed, that countries belonging to the GATT/WTO do not show 
very different trade patterns compared to outsiders (Rose, 2004). 
Thirdly, the ACP countries which are not included in the LDCs group face significant protection 
levels in all exporting markets considered. Such a result is particularly surprising in the case of the 
EU, since these countries benefit from one of the most generous trade preference scheme. However, 
despite a number of beneficiaries increasing over time, the share of EU imports from the ACP in 
total EU imports decreased from 6.7% in 1976 to 3.11% in 2002 (Manchin, 2005), and the 
European Commission itself expressed serious doubts on the benefits of the ACP preferential 
regime during the design of the Cotonou agreement (Bureau and Matthews, 2005a).   
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To better understand the difficulties faced by some countries in accessing the agricultural markets 
of three of the most important developed countries, it is worth recalling that a significant share of 
imports are MFN duty free in the QUAD countries (Canada, EU, Japan, US). On the other hand, all 
of the QUAD countries deny preferential access on some imports subject to positive MFN duties 
(Low et al., 2006).6 In the following tables (Tables 7,8, and 9) we show the contributions of the 
most relevant agricultural products to the total agricultural uniform tariff for each importing 
country.
                                                 
6
 For example, in the case of the EU agro-food imports under a non zero MFN duty from developing countries represent 
18% of total agro-food imports (Bureau and Matthews, 2005b). 
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Table 7 - Decomposition of EU agricultural MTRIs by sector
Uniform tariffs ACP Argentina ASEAN CHINA India Brazil Japan LDC
North 
Africa
NoWTO USA
Rest of 
Europe
EU candidates
Australia&New 
Zealand
Rest of 
Asia
Canada Mexico Turkey Chile
Rest of 
Latin 
America
Weighted average 15.1 11.3 11.7 15.0 7.8 20.4 7.3 0.0 10.4 4.3 8.8 6.3 11.0 9.2 4.3 6.1 4.7 12.4 9.0 20.8
MTRI 45.2 13.1 15.1 25.9 48.8 52.2 10.2 0.0 39.1 5.7 12.1 9.3 10.4 15.7 5.7 7.5 8.4 23.1 9.4 35.8
paddy rice 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.1 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
cereal grains 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
vegetables 2.3 1.4 0.1 7.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.3 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.4 4.6 14.3
sugar cane 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
sugar 26.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 4.2 0.6 0.0 14.5
oils&fats 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 15.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0
cattle 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
crops 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 2.5 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
animal products 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
fishing 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
meat 15.2 5.0 0.1 0.0 37.4 44.4 0.5 0.0 20.1 0.7 0.8 2.2 1.7 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 10.7 0.0 6.2
meat products 0.1 0.7 5.7 0.6 0.2 2.5 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.7 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.9 4.2 1.4 0.0
beverages&tobacco 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.0
food 0.8 4.9 3.1 2.6 1.1 3.2 3.3 0.0 0.3 1.5 3.6 2.0 1.5 0.4 0.8 2.8 1.7 0.2 1.8 0.3
dairy 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.4 0.7 4.7 0.7 12.8 0.0 2.5 0.1 2.5 0.1 0.0
processd rice 0.0 0.0 3.8 14.2 5.9 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.9 0.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5
Source: GTAP simulation
 
Table 8 - Decomposition of Japan agricultural MTRIs by sector
Uniform tariffs ACP Argentina ASEAN Brazil India USA China LDC
Euromed 
countries
NoWTO EU25
Rest of 
Europe
EU candidates
Australia&New 
Zealand
Rest of 
Asia
Canada Mexico Turkey Chile
Rest of 
Latin 
America
Weighted average 33.0 15.6 19.4 8.6 5.1 37.4 21.0 5.0 6.8 5.8 29.9 7.2 7.3 52.7 6.5 50.1 35.6 3.6 10.1 5.7
MTRI 105.5 57.1 63.1 13.1 151.8 67.7 92.5 62.9 7.9 19.6 69.0 13.3 9.1 121.7 6.8 81.9 54.0 4.5 35.5 129.4
paddy rice 0.0 0.0 15.8 0.0 0.0 32.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 10.9 22.9 0.0 0.0 15.2 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
wheat 61.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.4 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 25.4 0.0 36.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
cereal grains 2.4 5.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
oilseeds 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
vegetables 0.3 2.0 0.6 0.4 0.1 2.0 1.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 2.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7
sugar 39.4 35.8 5.4 4.5 6.0 5.3 0.0 1.9 1.0 0.7 4.2 0.2 0.0 12.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3
oils&fats 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
cattle 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
crops 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
animal products 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
wool 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
fishing 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
meat 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 13.8 0.0 3.0 1.6 0.0 5.6 2.0
meat products 0.0 0.2 1.2 3.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 2.1 19.0 28.9 5.1 3.5 1.2 0.0 32.2 51.6 0.2 16.0 0.1
beverages&tobacco 0.3 1.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.8 0.1 1.6 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1
food 0.9 1.5 3.7 2.8 1.2 4.1 0.9 5.8 2.7 2.0 2.7 4.6 2.2 2.1 4.2 0.8 0.3 1.3 2.2 1.1
dairy 0.0 10.5 5.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 13.2 1.5 5.9 2.8 1.7 4.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.2 9.5 0.1
processd rice 0.0 0.0 29.9 0.0 118.4 40.6 59.8 0.0 0.0 17.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 44.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 124.0
Source: GTAP simulation
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Table 9 - Decomposition of US agricultural MTRIs by sector
Uniform tariffs ACP Argentina ASEAN Brazil China India Japan LDC
Euromed 
countries
NoWTO EU25
Rest of 
Europe
EU candidates
Australia&New 
Zealand
Rest of 
Asia
Canada Mexico Turkey Chile
Rest of 
Latin 
America
Weighted average 5.7 7.0 2.4 6.9 2.6 1.1 3.2 2.3 2.3 2.0 3.3 6.7 7.0 4.8 0.7 1.1 0.3 6.7 1.5 2.3
MTRI 9.4 9.3 2.8 9.1 2.6 1.2 3.5 1.8 2.4 2.4 4.0 9.8 11.8 5.5 0.7 1.2 0.3 7.8 1.8 3.0
paddy rice 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
wheat 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
oilseeds 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
vegetables 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1
sugar 7.4 1.2 0.7 3.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.5
oils&fats 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
crops 0.8 1.3 0.8 3.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 6.0 0.1 0.3
meat 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
meat products 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
beverages&tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0
food 0.7 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.4 2.5 0.1 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.2
dairy 0.2 3.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.1 2.2 7.6 9.1 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.3 0.5 0.4
processd rice 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: GTAP simulation
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Table 7 confirms what are the “usual suspects” for the European protection. In the case of Brazil, 
the main difficulties are with the meat sector; while the dairy sector is responsible for most of the 
protection imposed on Australia and New Zealand agricultural exports, and “vegetable oils & fats” 
(such as olive oil) raises the largest difficulties for the Middle East and North Africa region.  
As far as developing countries are concerned, the most troubling sector is certainly sugar, which 
accounts for almost two thirds of the EU protection towards the ACP countries. These countries are 
subject to tariff rate quotas granting a preferential access up to a certain volume of imports. 
However, if the quota is binding, the level of protection reported in the database employed equals 
the out-of-quota tariff rate (section 3). Accordingly, the high level of protection denoted by the 
MTRI indicates that sugar regime “at the margin” is quite constraining and the exporters may 
benefit from a liberalization in this sector7. 
Table 8 shows that Japanese agricultural protection is much more concentrated in terms of sectors. 
Processed rice is by far the most protected product, and the protection is spread over several 
potential exporters. Wheat from Australia and New Zealand, and Canada, meat products from 
Mexico and Chile, and sugar from the ACP countries and South America are the other most 
protected sectors.  
As far as the US agricultural protection is concerned (table 9), the dairy sector stands out as the 
more protected one across several exporters. ACP and Latin American countries face the most 
significant protection in the case of sugar; while the processed food sector is the most protected in 
the case of Asian countries, such as Japan or China. 
Finally, Table 10 compares the results for the MTRI, and a more traditional indicator, the import-
weighted average tariff, in the case of the agricultural sector. We chose this sector because it 
includes the highest number of goods in our aggregation, and because it is the most relevant in 
terms of protection. Table 10 presents the correlation and rank correlations between the 20 bilateral 
results obtained for each of the three importers considered. 
 
                                                 
7
 This result, which may be credible for the aggregated country group included in this analysis, needs to be detailed 
further by (i) considering individual ACP countries, whose situation varies considerably depending on the production 
costs and production scale, (ii) by considering the overlapping between the ACPs and the LDCs which are going to be 
involved in the EBA initiative, and (iii) by modelling more explicitly the Tariff Rate Quotas available to each country. 
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r rho
EU 0.723** 0.833**
USA 0.962** 0.962**
Japan 0.433 0.388
Source: GTAP simulation
** significant at 0.01
Table 10 - Correlation coefficient and rank correlation coefficient among bilateral 
MTRI uniform tariffs and trade-weighted averages in the agricultural sectors
 
 
The MTRI uniform tariffs are always positively correlated with the trade-weighted averages, but the 
two indexes are almost identical only when protection is rather low. The correlation gets lower in 
the case of the EU, and it is not even statistically significant in the case of Japan.  
These results are in line with the findings of Anderson and Neary (2003) and Bach and Martin 
(2001), showing that the trade-weighted average tariff is a linear approximation to the tariff 
aggregator based on the expenditure function. Anderson and Neary (2003) also prove that the MTRI 
uniform tariff is more likely to be higher than the trade-weighted average, the more elastic is the 
demand for the tariff-constrained imports. In our case, the trade-weighted average consistently 
underpredicts the MTRI uniform tariff in the case of the EU and the US, and even more clearly in 
the case of Japan. Despite the MTRI uniform tariff and the trade-weighted index tend to move 
together on average, it should be emphasized that a purely statistical average does not provide a 
reliable approximation, especially when there are very high tariffs, as in the case of Japan.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
In order to compare the trade policies implemented by the EU, Japan and the US (section 2) we 
computed the overall protectionist impact at the bilateral level using a modified version of the 
GTAP model (section 3). The index chosen in order to assess the overall level of protection is the 
MTRI, that is the uniform tariff equivalent of the different trade policy instruments observed for a 
country that would generate the prevailing level of bilateral trade (section 4). 
The main conclusion of this study may be summarized as follows: 
• Notwithstanding all the rhetoric about trade preferences, we show that developing countries still 
appear to be substantially restricted in their trade with the EU, Japan, and the US.  
• Even if we work at a much higher level of aggregation than some recent literature investigating 
the relationship between per capita incomes of trading partners and tariff rates (Clark and Bruce, 
2006), our results are broadly consistent with the suggestion that rates are lower for the poorest 
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and richest countries, and higher for countries in the middle of the income distribution such as 
Brazil, India or Argentina. 
• The structure of protection across sectors appears to be fairly homogenous among the EU, 
Japan, and the US. In particular, agricultural products coming from the largest exporters among 
the developing countries appear to be face an higher overall protection than developed 
exporters, such as Australia and New Zealand. 
Certain observations about the limitations of our analysis are in order. Our estimates pertain only to 
the preference schemes included in the MacMap-HS6 (version 1) database, with the addition of a 
few schemes that are going to be implemented in the next future, such the EBA initiative. When all 
of the agreements mentioned in Section 2 will have been implemented, the actual protection faced 
by developing countries, or at least some of them, may be significantly lower.  
Nonetheless our results, which are generally consistent with other recent analyses (Kee, Nicita and 
Olarreaga, 2005), call for more careful considerations of the effective value of preferential trade 
schemes for the promotion of growth and development. When protection is measured assessed 
using a theoretically sound methodology, the actual tariff structures may still represent a serious 
limit to growth prospects of several developing countries.  
On the other hand, this does not certainly imply that actual preferential schemes are useless or 
totally ineffective. Our findings show that industrial nation tariffs tend to implicitly discriminate 
against products of export interest to developing countries: if one assumed away preferences – i.e., 
only MFN tariffs were applied – many developing countries would confront (even) higher 
protection than other countries. 
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